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INTRODUCTION
The 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refu-
gees ("Convention") defines a "refugee" as a person who is unable or
unwilling to return to her home country because of a "well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion."' The Convention
was originally adopted as a political strategy to aid ideological dissi-
dents fleeing Soviet bloc countries after World War II, and its definition
of refugee was temporally and geographically limited to facilitate that
goal.2 The 1967 United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refu-
gees ("Protocol") incorporated the Convention's definition without these
restrictions,3 and the United States signed on as a party in 1968.
Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 as part of the United
States' effort to fulfill its international obligations under the Conven-
tion.4 The Refugee Act defines "refugee" as an alien within the United
* J.D. 2001, University of Michigan Law School. Law Clerk to the Honorable Sam
Sparks, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, 2001-2003.
I. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. l(A)(2) 189
U.N.T.S. 2545 [hereinafter Convention].
2. The Convention limited the definition of refugee to those whose flight resulted from
a pre-1951 event in Europe. Convention, supra note I, art. 1(B)(I). See generally JAMES C.
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 6-9 (1991) (hereinafter HATHAWAY, REFUGEE
STATUS) (discussing the political goals of the Convention as evidenced in the travaux
preparatoires).
3. United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (hereinafter Protocol).
4. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The Senate Judiciary Committee's Report accompanying the
Refugee Act demonstrates Congress's intent to update the statutory definition of "refugee" to
comport with the United States' obligations under the Convention. See H.R. REP. No. 96-
608, at 1 (1979). See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) ("If one
thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of 'refugee' . . . it is that one
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States who is unwilling or unable to return home "because of persecu-
tion or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion."5 Any refugee who applies for asylum status in the United States
must meet this definition.
Refugee decisionmakers in many of the state parties to the Conven-
tion have struggled to define the causal relationship between the
persecution or threats thereof and the five Convention-protected grounds
required by the phrase "for reasons of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion." Courts agree
the phrase mandates some sort of causal connection, but disagree as to
what the phrase modifies and what degree of causation is required.6 In
1992, the United States Supreme Court addressed this causal connection
in INS v. Elias-Zacarias.7 Elias-Zacarias fled Guatemala after being
threatened by guerrillas when he resisted their recruitment attempts. The
Court denied him asylum status, finding that (1) Elias-Zacarias did not
resist recruitment because of his political opinion, and (2) he had not
shown the guerrillas threatened him because of his political opinion, and
they could have been motivated by the simple goal of increasing their
troops.8 The Court thus adopted a notion of causation based on the per-
secutor's intent, requiring an asylum applicant to provide some
evidence, direct or circumstantial, that her persecutor was motivated to
persecute her by her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group.9 Thus, the Court authorized
decisionmakers to focus their inquiry in asylum cases on discerning the
persecutor's reasons for his actions.
Lower courts adjudicating asylum cases since Elias-Zacarias have
struggled to follow the Supreme Court's mandate while confined within
the limited evidentiary record refugees are able to produce. Appellate
of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with
the 1967 United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.").
5. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (2000).
6. See, e.g., Horvath v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] 3 All E.R. 527 (H.L.
2000) (Eng.); R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah; Islam v. Sec'y of State for
the Home Dep't, [1999] 2 A.C. 629, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1015, [1999] 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L.
1999) (Eng.); Refugee Appeal No. 71462/99 (N.Z. 1999); 'Applicant A' and Anor v. Minister
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Anor (1997) 142 A.L.R. 331, 1997 AUST HIGHCT
LEXIS 4 (Austl.); Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689.
7. 502 U.S. 478 (1992). In the Refugee Act, Congress substituted "on account of" for
"for reasons of," which will be discussed in more depth, infra, Part III.
8. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483 ("Elias-Zacarias still has to establish that the record
also compels the conclusion that he has a 'well-founded fear' that the guerrillas will perse-





decisions have varied, with courts in many cases imposing a stricter evi-
dentiary requirement than the Supreme Court required. Most of the
confusion revolves around the Supreme Court's statement that circum-
stantial evidence of motive is as acceptable as direct evidence,' ° and
lower courts' attempts to decipher what inferences from circumstantial
evidence are acceptable under the Elias-Zacarias framework. As a re-
sult, applicants' asylum cases with remarkably similar facts emerge with
opposite outcomes, rendering the asylum adjudication process arbitrary.
The disparity stems from the almost impossible task of discerning the
motives of persecutors who may not articulate their motives to their vic-
tims and are not present in the asylum adjudication to be interrogated
about them. Not only are these outcomes unfair to asylum-seekers, but
they are inconsistent with both the Court's holding in Elias-Zacarias
and the international requirements of the Convention itself.
This Article examines the evolution of the nexus requirement in
United States refugee law since the Elias-Zacarias decision. Part I dis-
cusses the Supreme Court's decision in Elias-Zacarias, identifying the
choices the Court made among the arguments presented before it that
resulted in the motive-oriented approach to nexus. This Part also delves
into the Court's statement about the evidence required to demonstrate
motive, concluding that the Court's treatment of the evidence before it
foreshadows the confusion lower courts have demonstrated in evaluating
evidence of motive. Part 11 looks at appellate decisions on the nexus is-
sue since 1992, highlighting cases that exemplify the disparity among
appellate decisions. This Part concludes that the appellate courts' differ-
ing evidentiary requirements have resulted in a lack of uniformity that is
both unfair to asylum applicants and contrary to the United States' treaty
obligations. Part III addresses how asylum decisionmakers could work
within the precedent of Elias-Zacarias to bring the United States closer
to compliance with international law. Specifically, this Part argues that a
thoughtful use of inferences from circumstantial evidence of the appli-
cant's predicament could ensure that applicants receive fair and uniform
treatment in the application of the nexus requirement. This Article con-
cludes that, to comply with the mandates of both the Convention and
Elias-Zacarias, courts must focus on the predicament from which the
asylum applicant fled, and use circumstantial evidence to infer motive
instead of placing an undue burden on the applicant to prove the perse-
cutor's state of mind.
10. Id.
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN ELIAS-ZACARIAS
In INS v. Elias-Zacarias, the leading American case on the nexus is-
sue, the Court held that refugee decisionmakers must determine whether
or not the asylum applicant's persecutors were motivated to persecute or
threaten her by her race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or mem-
bership in a particular social group. Part I looks into the background of
the case and the arguments leading up to the Court's opinion and dis-
cusses the key choices the Court made in the decision. This Part points
out the elements of the decision that resulted in the current confusion in
the lower courts about how applicants can prove their persecutors' mo-
tive, concluding that while the Court's decision may not have been
inherently harmful to asylum-seekers, the Court's failure to give more
guidance opened the door for inconsistency and harsh outcomes in the
lower courts.
The facts of Jairo Jonathan Elias-Zacarias' case are typical for refu-
gees fleeing from countries torn apart by civil wars between militant
guerrilla groups and the government. Elias-Zacarias left Guatemala in
March 1987, two months after two armed, partially masked guerrillas
came to his home and tried to recruit him." When he refused to join
them, the guerrillas threatened that they would be back, and admonished
him to "think it [over] well."'2 Elias-Zacarias testified credibly to these
facts and presented evidence that the guerrillas in Guatemala engage in
forced recruitment.'3 While the Immigration Judge and Board of Immi-
gration Appeals denied his application, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the Board, concluding the evidence that the guerrillas
engaged in forced recruitment created an inference that their threatened
persecution of Elias-Zacarias was to further their political goals of over-
turning the government. " Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found Elias-
Zacarias' refusal to join the guerrillas functioned as an implied assertion
of a pro-government political opinion.' 5 Thus, the Ninth Circuit focused
11. Id. at 480.
12. Id. at 479 (quoting the Immigration Judge's summary of Elias-Zacarias's testimony).
13. Elias-Zacarias v. INS, 921 F2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
14. Id. at 852.
[T]he threat to Elias was for political as opposed to personal reasons ... there was
no evidence to rebut the common sense inference that the guerrillas were inter-
ested in recruiting Elias to further the group's political goals. There was thus a
reasonable possibility ... that the guerrillas would return and take Elias by force,
thereby persecuting him on account of political opinion.
Id.
15. Id. at 850 ("The persecution is properly categorized as 'on account of political opin-
ion' because the person resisting forced recruitment is expressing a political opinion hostile
[Vol. 23:223
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on the guerrillas' political motives and how those motives would lead
them to interpret Elias-Zacarias' decision, rendering him in a dangerous
position, not on Elias-Zacarias' actual political opinion.
The Supreme Court interpreted the Ninth Circuit's opinion as a
blanket assertion that any applicant who was a victim of forced recruit-
ment by a political group suffered persecution "on account of' political
opinion per se. 6 Indeed, Justice Scalia's majority opinion stated the ques-
tion presented in the case as "whether a guerrilla organization's attempt to
coerce a person into performing military service necessarily constitutes
'persecution on account of... political opinion.""' 7 With the issue framed
thus, it is easy to see why the Court approached Elias-Zacarias' case with
skepticism. Given the prevalence of politically-charged civil war, an af-
firmative answer to that question would open the floodgates to many
asylum applicants from war-torn third world countries, and the Court
may have sought a means to limit such an interpretation of the refugee
definition. 8
The first question the briefs required the Supreme Court to clarify was
whether the "on account of' language modifies "persecution" or "well-
founded fear." The amicus brief of the Lawyer's Committee for Human
Rights and the American Jewish Committee argued that the five Conven-
tion-protected grounds could be connected either to the applicant's fear
("well-founded fear") or the persecutor's motivation ("persecution").' 9 The
government argued that only the persecutor's motivation was relevant,
because the "on account of' language modifies "persecution" and the or-
dinary meaning of "persecution" includes an element of intent. ° The
government equated "on account of' with "because of" concluding that
to the persecutor and because the persecutors' motive in carrying out the kidnapping is po-
litical.").
16. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 480 ("The court ruled that acts of conscription by a non-
governmental group constitute persecution on account of political opinion.").
17. Id. at 479.
18. The INS raised this "floodgates" argument in its brief, so it must have been at least
in the back of the Justices' minds. Brief for Petitioner at Argument A.3, para. 8, Elias-
Zacarias (No. 90-1342) ("[Tjhe court of appeals' reading of the 'on account of' clause opens
asylum to anyone with a well-founded fear of physical harm at the hands of a political fac-
tion.").
19. Brief of Amicae Curiae The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Ameri-
can Jewish Committee at 5, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-1342) ("The reasons can have their nexus
either with the applicant's fear or with the persecutor's motivation.").
20. Brief for Petitioner at Summary of Argument A, para. 1, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-
1342) ("The state of mind of the persecutor is also an element, since 'persecution' means the
infliction of suffering on a person because of the victim's beliefs. Thus, the persecutor's state
of mind is determinative of whether persecution is 'on account of' a political belief held by
the victim."). The Petitioner's brief defined "persecution" to mean "the infliction of suffering
because of the victim's race, beliefs, or nationality, especially religious beliefs." Id. at Argu-
ment A. 1, para. 1.
Winter 20021
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Elias-Zacarias must show the guerrillas persecuted or threatened to per-
secute him because of his political opinion.2' Thus, while the
persecutor's motive for persecution is determinative, the persecutor's
political opinion is not relevant-only the victim's political opinion
matters. 2 This argument, which the Court ultimately adopted, 3 under-
mined the Ninth Circuit's decision that the guerrillas' general political
motives established the required nexus to political opinion.
The Court thus adopted a two-step inquiry in nexus cases: (1)
whether the applicant actually holds a political opinion, religious belief,
and so on; and (2) if so, whether his persecutors were motivated to per-
secute him by that opinion. The Court first determined that Elias-
Zacarias' motive for refusing to join the guerrillas was instrumental, not
political, because he was concerned about government retaliation.2 ' The
Court did not decide whether Elias-Zacarias's neutrality constituted an
"affirmative expression of a political opinion," or whether his refusal led
the guerrillas to impute a political opinion to him, because it found that
21. Brief for Petitioner at Argument A.l, para. 1, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-1342). The
INS relied on dictionary definitions to determine that "on account of" means "because of."
22. Brief for Petitioner at Argument A. 1, para. 4, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-1342) (assert-
ing that,
'[p]ersecution' is the infliction (or threatened infliction (or threatened infliction) of
suffering on a person because of that person's characteristics, not the persecutor's.
It is irrelevant that the persecutor's motives are 'political' in nature, or that the per-
secutor has 'political goals' ... unless the persecutor intends to hurt the asylum
applicant because of the applicant's political opinion, the applicant is not eligible
for asylum).
23. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482.
The ordinary meaning of the phrase 'persecution on account of ... political opin-
ion in § 101 (a)(42) is persecution on account of the victim's political opinion, not
the persecutor's .... Thus, the mere existence of a generalized 'political' motive
underlying the guerrillas' forced recruitment is inadequate to establish (and in-
deed, goes far to refute) the proposition that Elias-Zacarias fears persecution on
account of political opinion.
Id.
24. Id.
The record in the present case not only failed to show a political motive on Elias-
Zacarias' part; it showed the opposite. He testified that he refused to join the guer-
rillas because he was afraid that the government would retaliate against him and
his family if he did so. Nor is there any indication (assuming, arguendo, it would




the guerrillas were not motivated by his neutrality or imputed political
25opinion.
Since Elias-Zacarias, courts have uniformly accepted claims of per-
secution on account of imputed political opinion, where persecutors
presume their victims hold a particular political opinion although they
do not actually hold that opinion.26 This analysis diverts courts' attention
from the victim's political opinion, and focuses instead on the persecu-
27tor's political opinion, which is often easier for applicants to prove.
By accepting the interpretation of "on account of" as modifying per-
secution and including an element of motive, the Court inserted an
unfamiliar element into asylum cases: the persecutor's state of mind.28
For instance, if an asylum applicant from Zimbabwe testifies that he
fears persecution by blacks because he is a white farmer, the reasons for
his fear are irrelevant unless the court finds that his persecutors' motive
for persecuting or threatening to persecute him was his race. This focus
on the persecutor's motive is significantly different than the inquiry in
cases concerning the other elements of the refugee definition, which is
largely limited to consideration of the applicant's fear and evidence
25. Id. at 483 ("Elias-Zacarias appears to argue that not taking sides with any political
faction is itself the affirmative expression of a political opinion .... But we need not decide
whether the evidence compels the conclusion that Elias-Zacarias held a political opinion.").
26. The Ninth Circuit first identified this ground for relief on remand in Canas-Segovia
v. INS, the companion case to Elias-Zacarias:
Imputed political opinion is still a valid basis for relief after Elias-Zacarias. The
Court made clear that evidence of motive is required, but imputed political opin-
ion, by definition, includes an element of motive. A persecutor falsely attributes an
opinion to the victim, and then persecutes the victim because of that mistaken be-
lief about the victim's views.
Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1992). The other circuits have fol-
lowed suit. See, e.g., Morales v. INS, 208 F.3d 323 (1st Cir. 2000); Basova v. INS, 1999 WL
495640, *3 (10th Cir. July 14, 1999) (unpublished disposition); Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d
1129 (7th Cir. 1992).
27. The Ninth Circuit recognized this switch: "In establishing an imputed political opin-
ion, the focus of inquiry turns away from the views of the victim to the views of the
persecutor." Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997). The court applied this
analysis to find persecution on account of imputed political opinion in Agbuya v. INS, stating
"[W]e must look at how [the applicant] was viewed in the eyes of the persecutors. Here, the
guerilla NPA viewed Agbuya as an enemy of the miners, the NPA, and the communist cause."
219 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, the guerrillas' political opinion provided circum-
stantial evidence that they imputed a political opinion to their victim and persecuted her
pursuant to that imputation, rather than merely persecuting her in retaliation for the person-
nel decisions she made against the persecutors' union.
28. Although the persecutor's intent is unfamiliar in the asylum inquiry as a whole, the
Board of Immigration Appeals had inquired into intent to determine nexus prior to Elias-
Zacarias, so the Court's holding did not represent an entirely new approach to the nexus
determination. See Brief for Petitioner at Argument A.4, para. 2, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-
1342) (citing Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (BIA 1987); Matter of Acosta,
19 1. & N. Dec. 211,223 (BIA 1985)).
Winter 2002]
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about the circumstances in her home country. 9 Moreover, the Court's
holding raises the dilemma of how a court can determine a persecutor's
motive from the limited evidence before it. In asylum cases, the
persecutor is not a party and is not present during the proceedings.
Instead, the judge relies on the applicant's testimony and other
corroborating evidence, including documentary evidence of conditions
in the applicant's home country. Thus, the obvious difficulty for asylum-
seekers-as Elias-Zacarias noted in his brief-is producing evidence
that their persecutors were motivated by their race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. °
The Court addressed the struggle for asylum applicants to produce
evidence of motive by asserting that direct evidence of motive is not
necessary, but circumstantial evidence of intent will suffice. The Court
went on to note, however, that the applicant must produce compelling
evidence for the appellate court to overturn the Board of Immigration
Appeals-an administrative law requirement that increases the burden
on applicants to produce high quality evidence.32 Moreover, despite the
Court's explicit rejection of a direct evidence requirement in its opin-
29. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (interpreting the "well-
founded fear" requirement to be focused on the applicant's "subjective beliefs," provided
there is an objective basis for them). See also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees in Support of Respondent at 10, Elias-
Zacarias (No. 90-1342) stating,
[tihe definition of "refugee" requires focus on the state of mind of the person
seeking refugee status, not on that of the persecutor. Under the terms of the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol, a person seeking refugee status must demonstrate:
(I) that he or she has a well-founded fear; (2) that he or she fears persecution; (3)
that the feared persecution is for reasons of, (4) one of the five enumerated factors
(e.g. political opinion).
30. Brief for Respondent at Argument I.B., para. 3, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-1342).
If this Court were to accept the government's position, it would be impossible, as a
practical matter, for many if not most refugees ever to establish their eligibility for
asylum, because they could not produce direct evidence of their persecutors' mo-
tives. For example, in Elias-Zacarias' situation, where would one begin? Whose
motives should be proven, those of the two masked men carrying machine guns?
or those of their officers? or those of the founders of the guerrilla movement? How
could Elias-Zacarias-who did not know the names or addresses of his persecu-
tors--obtain evidence of their subjective motivations?
Id.
3 1. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483 ("Elias-Zacarias objects that he cannot be expected
to provide direct proof of his persecutors' motives. We do not require that. But since the
statute makes motive critical, he must provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial.").
32. Id. at 483-84 ("[l]f he seeks to obtain judicial reversal of the BIA's determination,
he must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution."). This requirement is born out of a princi-
ple of administrative law that requires courts to defer to administrative courts' evidentiary
determinations except in limited circumstances. See NLRB v. Columbian Enameling &
Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
[Vol. 23:223
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ion,33 the Court refused to infer motive from circumstantial evidence in
Elias-Zacarias' case, establishing a high standard of evidentiary prece-
dent. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit inferred from the circumstances of the
civil war in Guatemala that Elias-Zacarias' refusal to join the guerrillas
would be interpreted by the guerrillas as a pro-government political
opinion and, thus, their persecution of him would be "on account of'
that imputed political opinion.34 The Supreme Court rejected that infer-
ence, despite the dissent's assertion that the petitioner's testimony
revealed that the guerrillas would see his refusal to join as expressive
conduct." Instead, the Court submitted its own alternative motive for the
guerrillas to persecute Elias-Zacarias: to increase their troops.36 Given
the Court's evaluation of the evidence in Elias-Zacarias' case, it is not
surprising that lower courts have often been reluctant to infer motive
from circumstantial evidence and have instead resorted to fishing for
direct evidence of motive.
The Supreme Court in Elias-Zacarias clarified that the "on account
of" clause requires courts to inquire into the persecutor's motives for
persecuting or threatening to persecute the asylum-seeker. If the asylum
applicant cannot produce compelling evidence that her persecutor was
motivated by her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or mem-
bership of a particular social group, she will not meet the nexus
requirement, and her application will be denied. This holding presented a
challenge for lower courts to discover ways to infer the absent persecutor's
33. One Justice also expressed skepticism in the oral argument about relying on direct
communication from persecutors to victims when he asked the attorney for the government
whether a statement from the guerrillas that they persecuted the applicant because of his
political opinion would be enough to change the outcome of an asylum case. Official Tran-
script of Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States, 1991 U.S. Trans.
LEXIS 229, *21, 23, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-1342) ("And all it takes to change our whole
immigration law is for the leader of the guerrillas to say, he who is not with us is against us,
and if he says that, automatically, these are-they're all being persecuted for their religious
views? Is that what the law is really?").
34. Elias-Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 850 (1990) ("The persecution is properly cate-
gorized as 'on account of political opinion,' because the person resisting forced recruitment
is expressing a political opinion hostile to the persecutor.").
35. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 488 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Here, respondent not only engaged in expressive conduct by refusing to join the
guerrilla organization but also explained that he did so '[b]ecause they see very
well, that if you join the guerrillas. . . then you are against the government... and
if you join them then it is to die there. And, then the government is against you
and against your family.' Respondent thus expressed the political view that he was
for the government and against the guerrillas.
Id. (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 483 n.2 ("It is quite plausible, indeed likely, that the taking [of Elias-Zacarias]
would be engaged in by the guerrillas in order to augment their troops rather than show their
displeasure.").
Winter 20021
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motive-other than the inference the Court itself rejected. As Part II will
discuss, appellate courts have been struggling since Elias-Zacarias to
establish a standard for determining motive, and this struggle has pro-
duced varying results, many of which are contrary to the requirement
the Elias-Zacarias Court articulated.
II. THE APPLICATION OF ELIAS-ZACARIAS IN THE LOWER COURTS
The Supreme Court made clear in Elias-Zacarias that the persecu-
tor's motive behind carrying out the persecution or threats thereof
determines whether the persecution was "on account of' race, religion,
political opinion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group.
Although this focus is clear from the majority opinion, the Court offered
little guidance to courts as to how to investigate the absent persecutor's
intent. This Part identifies the resulting confusion among lower courts
concerning the appropriate evidentiary burden that asylum applicants
must meet to demonstrate that their persecutors were motivated by one
of the grounds authorized by the Convention. This Part concludes that
many appellate courts have interpreted Elias-Zacarias to require direct
evidence of the persecutor's intent, thus adding an additional element to
the requirements of the Convention definition in violation of the Su-
preme Court's mandate in Elias-Zacarias and the Convention itself.
Many lower courts have demonstrated confusion about what type of
evidence refugees must present to prove that their persecutors were mo-
tivated, at least in part, 7 by a Convention ground. This question of
adequacy of evidence has come to permeate the nexus analysis, and is-
sues concerning the sufficiency of evidence of intent have dominated the
case law since the Supreme Court articulated the requirement in Elias-
Zacarias. Courts often require applicants to provide direct evidence of
37. Since Elias-Zacarias, lower courts have expanded the motive requirement to include
situations where the persecutor was motivated by more than a protected ground (also known
as "mixed-motive" cases). See, e.g., Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, (9th Cir. 1999); Singh v.
Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[Plersecutory conduct may have more than one
motive, and so long as one motive is one of the statutorily enumerated grounds, the require-
ments have been satisfied*"); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The plain
meaning of the phrase 'persecution on account of the victim's political opinion,' does not
mean persecution solely on account of the victim's political opinion."); In re S-P-, Interim
Decision 3287 (BIA 1996) (en banc) ("In some fact situations, the evidence may reasonably
suggest mixed motives, at least one or more of which is related to a protected ground.").
Thus, as long as the persecution was at least partly motivated by a Convention ground, the
applicant can meet the "on account of" requirement. The applicant does not have to show
that "but for" the prohibited motive, the persecution would not have occurred. See, e.g., Ga-
foor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645, 653 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting as an overly "rigid" approach to
causation the dissent's contention that the applicant must prove that but for the Convention
ground, the persecution would not have happened).
[Vol. 23:223
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their persecutors' motives, despite the Supreme Court's specific rejec-
tion of such a requirement in Elias-Zacarias. Particularly, courts favor
persecutors' communication of their motives to their victims. When an
applicant can recall specific statements her attacker made around the
time of the attack indicating a Convention-protected motive, her asylum
case is likely to be granted. 9 Indeed, the absence of such statements can
prove dispositive. Although no court has yet explicitly required evidence
of direct communication of intent, some appellate decisions indicate
that it is a de facto requirement: in denying asylum, these courts high-
light segments of the applicant's testimony to demonstrate that the
applicant presented no proof that the persecutor communicated a motive
to her. For example, the Ninth Circuit's recent opinion in Quirino v. INS
relied on the applicant's failure to testify to the Immigration Judge that
the guerrillas orally explained to her their reasons for raping her and her
daughter.0 At minimum, appellate decisions since Elias-Zacarias reveal
a preference for direct communication of motive, despite the obvious
38. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483 ("Elias-Zacarias objects that he cannot be expected
to provide direct proof of his persecutors' motives. We do not require that. But since the
statute makes motive critical, he must provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial.").
39. For example, in Vera-Valera v. INS, the Ninth Circuit found persecution on account
of imputed political opinion where the guerillas "told [the applicant] to quit the cooperative
or die and that they would 'cut off his ideas' if he continued to advocate them" and "accused
him of being a spy for the government, a capitalist bureaucrat and a traitor." Vera-Valera v.
INS, 147 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Agbuya v. INS, 219 F.3d 962, 967 (9th
Cir. 2000).
Once [the applicant] was perceived as an enemy of a particular group of workers
.. the NPA targeted her as an enemy of the 'laborers' of the whole country and
thus as an opponent of the guerilla group. This link was made explicitly by Ag-
buya's NPA persecutors, who berated her for opposing their egalitarian ideology
by acting unfairly toward the miners.
Id.
40. Quirino v. INS, 254 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2001) (including testimony in which the
Immigration Judge asked a woman who was raped by guerrillas, "After they completed rap-
ing you and your daughter, did they say anything to you?" and "Okay, did these people do
anything other than say they were going to rape you?"). The dissent in Quirino noted that the
majority's conclusion "suggests that [the applicant] could satisfy her burden of proof only by
testifying that the rapists explicitly informed her-before, during, or after raping her-that
she had been singled out because of her father's political position. We have never held that
an asylum applicant must satisfy this impossible evidentiary standard." Id. at 870 (Pregerson,
J., dissenting). See also Basova v. INS, 1999 WL 495640, *3 (10th Cir. July 14, 1999) (un-
published disposition) ("Ms. Basova testified that her attackers never explained anything to
her, but she felt that they hated her due to how they dealt with her and called her names.").
The court contrasted Basova's case with another case where "[the applicant's] persecutor
told the alien that he regarded her actions as subversive and he attributed the political opin-
ion of a subversive to her .... No such statements were made by Ms. Basova's persecutors."
Id. (citations omitted).
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practical impediments to obtaining such evidence, which at least one
appellate court has acknowledged.'
Courts' preference for persecutors' communication of their motives
42not only contradicts the plain language of Elias-Zacarias but also pro-
vides an additional hurdle for asylum applicants who cannot identify
their attackers. In many asylum cases, applicants do not know exactly
who their persecutors were, because they were disguised or simply did
not identify themselves. 3 Without knowledge of their attackers' identity,
these applicants can rarely identify their attackers' motive. Although
some courts have acknowledged this difficulty, others have shown no
lenience and, consequently, have denied these applicants asylum."
Some courts rely too heavily on persecutors' communication of their
motives, deferring to the persecutors' articulated reasons for their ac-
tions instead of inferring an additional motive from circumstantial
evidence."3 Other courts infer a motive-typically one not protected by
41. The Ninth Circuit recently acknowledged the difficulty of obtaining evidence of mo-
tive directly from the persecutors' mouth, stating
[The nexus] question goes to the motives of [the applicant's] persecutors, and as
we have long recognized, motives can be difficult to pin down. Persecutors do not
always take the time to tell their victims all the reasons they are being beaten or
kidnaped [sic] or killed. Sometimes, they may not want their motives known for
fear of public condemnation; other times, the motives may be so clear to both par-
ties that no explanation is needed.
Gafoor, 231 F.3d at 650.
42. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483 ("Elias-Zacarias objects that he cannot be expected
to provide direct proof of his persecutors' motives. We do not require that.").
43. The Board of Immigration Appeals acknowledged this difficulty in a 1996 case:
[lI]t is often difficult to determine the exact motive or motives for which harm has
been inflicted. There are at least two distinct areas of uncertainty in proving mo-
tive. First, in some cases, the events are such that no particular motive is readily
ascertainable. For example, an unprovoked attack by unknown assailants may or
may not have been for reasons protected by the [Refugee] Act. Without some evi-
dence, either direct or circumstantial, of the reasons for the attack, the applicant
will fail to prove eligibility for asylum.
In re S-P-, Interim Decision 3287.
44. See, e.g., Lakhani v. INS, 175 F.3d 1020, 1999 WL 164921 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpub-
lished disposition) (denying asylum because "Lakhani did not testify that the kidnappers
identified themselves as [members of a specific political party], that they wore any clothing
or insignia to identify themselves as such, or that they taunted him about his political be-
liefs."); Kozulin v. INS, 218 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (where the court did not find a
causal link between the applicant's denunciation of his ship captain's corruption and refusal
to join the Communist party and the attack on him a few weeks later because "[h]e did not
know who his assailants were, and he did not testify that they said anything to him.").
45. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Sangha v. INS found no evidence that the terrorist
group persecuted the applicant because it imputed his father's political opinion to him:
[T]he BTF gave two reasons why it wanted to recruit Sangha. First, it wanted
Sangha to help fight for Khalistan. This reason suggests that it was acting in fur-
therance of its own goals, rather than to persecute Sangha for any views he might
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the Convention-when the attackers fail to articulate one, despite cir-
cumstantial evidence pointing to a contrary conclusion. For example, the
Eight Circuit inserted its own logic in place of circumstantial evidence
of discriminatory intent in Miranda v. INS. The Court decided that guer-
illas had chosen to recruit one applicant because she was young, not
because of her political opinion, despite the applicant's testimony that
they threatened to kill her after she told them she supported the govern-
ment. 6 At the other extreme, the Ninth Circuit has held that when there
appears to be no logical reason for persecution, it will hold that it must
have been on account of political opinion.4 These cases reveal the diver-
gent standards emerging among the circuits when some courts rely
heavily on evidence of communication of motive because they lack a
clear understanding of how much circumstantial evidence is required to
meet the burden established by Elias-Zacarias.
Courts also prefer evidence that the persecution was a response to
applicants' statements revealing a particular political opinion. While this
type of evidence is technically circumstantial evidence, since it requires
the judge to make an inference that the persecutor acted in response to
the victim's statement, it is the most manifest form of circumstantial
evidence available. For instance, the Ninth Circuit granted asylum to an
applicant who told members of a violent, anti-government group she
would not join their group because she was pro-government and did not
agree with their organization, and they responded with threats of murder
and, subsequently, economic extortion 4  Evidence of an applicant's
hold. Second, the BTF wanted to make Sangha unavailable to support his father.
This reason suggests that it wanted to punish Sangha's father, rather than to perse-
cute Sangha for his political beliefs.
Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1997). This excerpt demonstrates that the
court chose to defer to the persecutors' articulated motives for pursuing the applicant, and
even went so far as to expand on the "logic" of the terrorists' reasoning.
46. Miranda v. INS, 139 F3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1998).
While petitioner testified that the FMLN members threatened to kill her after she
told them that she supported the government, the evidence suggests that her sup-
port for the government was not the reason for their efforts to recruit her or their
threats .... [lit appeared that they tried to recruit her because of her relatively
young age.
Id.
47. Ernesto Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 657 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]his court has held per-
secution to be on account of political opinion where there appears to be no other logical
reason for the persecution at issue.").
48. Borja v. INS, 175 E3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc), stating:
In contrast to the record in Elias-Zacarias, which did not contain any clear
evidence of the guerillas' motive, either direct or circumstantial, Ms. Borja
articulated her political opposition to the [New People's Army] as the reason for
her refusal to join. We know that the NPA agents acted in direct response to her
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communication of political opinion to her attackers can be the deciding
factor in an asylum claim, despite at least one court's recognition that
demanding an applicant endanger herself further by engaging in a po-
litical debate with her attackers is too stringent a requirement.49
A comparison of the Ninth Circuit's decisions in the recent,
factually similar appeals of Tecun-Florian and Cordon-Garcia reveals
how determinative evidence of a refugee's communication of her
political beliefs to her attackers can be.50 Both involved refugees from
Guatemala who resisted recruitment from guerrillas and were
subsequently persecuted. Tecun-Florian refused to join the guerrillas
because he was a devout Catholic, and killing for any purpose was
against his religion. He attended church twice a week; the guerrillas
waited outside the church and watched as he went in. One night, they
abducted him and tortured him for ten days. Cordon-Garcia refused to
join the guerrillas because she already had a job teaching literacy at a
government-funded school. One night, a guerilla abducted her and tried
to get her to join his group; when she refused, he beat her. The Ninth
Circuit granted Cordon-Garcia's asylum application, but not Tecun-
Florian's. The major distinction between the cases seems to be that
statement of political opposition and revulsion at their methods because their
immediate reaction was to 'get mad' and point a gun at her.
See also Velasquez-Valencia v. INS, 244 F.3d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 2001); Diaz-Marroquin v. INS,
No. 98-70392, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2352, *7 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished disposition)
(holding that the applicant proved his persecution to be "on account of' political opinion by
testifying that "when the guerrillas confronted him, he told them directly that he would not
join their forces because of his anti-communist politics"); Kozulin, 218 F.3d at 1117 (distin-
guishing the case at hand from Borja because "Kozulin did not 'articulate [his] political
opposition'; he gave no indication of political opinion beyond refusing to accept the offer of
party membership. Kozulin alleges no 'direct response' to his refusal; three weeks passed
before the anonymous attack.").
49. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the absurdity of such a requirement in a 1993 case,
where it overturned the BIA's holding that guerrillas did not persecute the applicant on ac-
count of her political opinion because she told them she could not assist them because she
needed to care for her child:
[T]he BIA's reasoning implicitly imposes an unrealistic requirement on entitle-
ment to asylum: That an alien must foolhardily court death by informing armed
guerrillas to their faces that she detests them or their actions or their ideologies-
or all of the above. Otherwise, under the BIA's reasoning, one who tries to avoid
cooperation by offering some benign pretext in an effort to avoid cooperating
without antagonizing her ruthless recruiters, will effectively be barred from prov-
ing that the guerrillas nevertheless knew of her political opposition. Obviously,
any person who is not bent on martyrdom is likely to attempt to defuse or avoid
the potentially deadly situation by proffering a convincing but non-offensive ex-
cuse-here, the sympathetic plea of a recently widowed mother who alone must
now care for her child.
Rivas-Martinez v. INS, 997 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993).
50. Tecun-Florian v. INS, 207 F3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2000); Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204
F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Tecun-Florian did not tell his persecutors that he would not join them
because of his religion; in fact, he did not give them any reason at all,
and they did not explain their motives for targeting him.' Cordon-
Garcia, on the other hand, gave her persecutors a reason for not joining
their cause: she "already had a position at the school*'52 The guerillas
also told her the reason they were targeting her: because teaching
literacy undermined their recruitment efforts. The Ninth Circuit found a
nexus to imputed political opinion in Cordon-Garcia's case because her
response informed the guerrillas that "she planned to continue
alignment with a cause obviously at odds with the guerrillas' goals," and
the guerrillas "unmistakably" believed that she "was aligned with the
government as a result of her profession."53 While Tecun-Florian's
persecutors had not mentioned his religion as their motive for torturing
him, Cordon-Garcia's persecutors articulated their political reasons for
targeting her, even though the reasons were not directly related to her
political opinion, but rather to their own political opinion about her
chosen employment. These verbal exchanges made all the difference for
Cordon-Garcia. The different outcomes in these cases exemplify the
inconsistency and randomness that results from courts' overly stringent
evidentiary requirements.
The Supreme Court in Elias-Zacarias specifically stated that circum-
stantial evidence of a Convention-protected motive can satisfy the nexus
requirement. 4 However, the Court did not provide a standard for determin-
ing what circumstantial evidence constitutes motive. Perhaps courts rely
heavily on evidence of communication between asylum-seekers and their
persecutors because they do not know what circumstantial evidence suf-
fices. Courts vary widely in what circumstances they will rely on as
evidence of persecutory intent. Courts have also exhibited confusion about
the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence.5 In one Ninth
51. Tecun-Florian, 207 E3d at 1110.
[T]he only evidence suggesting that the guerrillas were motivated by anything
other than Tecun-Florian's refusal to join them was the testimony that they saw
him going to church. We cannot say that the BIA was unreasonable in finding that
the guerrillas' actions were not motivated by the guerrillas' perception of Tecun-
Florian's religious beliefs or political opinion.
Id.
52. Cordon-Garcia, 204 E3d at 991.
53. Id. at 991-92.
54. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992).
55. Gafoor v. INS, 231 F3d, 651, 651-52. Gafoor identified the persecutors' racist re-
marks not as direct, but as circumstantial evidence that they were motivated by his race. The
court stated that the soldiers' statement to Gafoor while beating him that he should "go back
to India" is "unmistakable circumstantial evidence that they were motivated by his race and
imputed political opinion:' although "[tihey did not tell him specifically that they were moti-
vated by these factors." Id. The dissenting judge went so far as to argue that the remarks
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Circuit case, the court referred to racist remarks soldiers made while
beating the applicant as circumstantial evidence that they were moti-
vated by his race, although such communication is perhaps the best
example of direct evidence available. This widespread confusion leads
to an arbitrary and non-uniform application of both the refugee defini-
tion and the Elias-Zacarias decision. Most asylum-seekers depend on
circumstantial evidence of motive, because it is rare that persecutors
explicitly disclose their motives. Additionally, unlike many situations
where motive is at issue, the persecutor is not present in the courtroom.
Asylum-seekers must do their best to put forth evidence of motive when
they are not sure how much and what kind of evidence it will take to
convince the court to infer a persecutorial motive. Further uncertainty
results from the possibility that two applications based on virtually iden-
tical facts will have different results based on which appellate circuit the
case was filed in, or even which three judges are on the panel.
Some courts have inferred motive from circumstantial evidence of
the political situation in the asylum-seeker's home country. In such
cases, courts interpret the refugee's actions or statements in light of the
context of the home country, finding that these words or actions took on
a distinct significance and led to persecution on account of a Convention
reason. 56 For example, the Ninth Circuit granted asylum to an applicant
who was repeatedly robbed by ethnic Fijians and denied police protec-
tion, finding the racial tension in Fiji provided circumstantial evidence
that he was targeted because he was Indian. 7 Other courts have refused
(which he considered an "off-the-cuff accusation and slur") did not require the conclusion
that the beatings were on account of Gafoor's imputed political opinion and race. Id. at 658
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
56. See, e.g., Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 E3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001) (using evi-
dence that domestic violence is often used by men "to dominate and persecute members of
his immediate family" to conclude that the applicant was abused on account of her family
membership).
57. See Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2000), where the court rejected
the BIA's finding that the robberies were not on account of the applicant's race.
It is true that, according to Chand's testimony, the robbers never made their motive
for robbing him entirely clear, and furthermore that Chand never explicitly alleged
that he was robbed because of his race, although he noted that the robbers were
ethnic Fijians, and at other places in his testimony described the general racial ten-
sion and discrimination faced by Indians in Fiji. Similarly, Chand did not state in
so many words that the police did not protect him because of his race. However, as
the Supreme Court made clear in its seminal case on the subject, direct evidence of
a persecutor's motives is not required to show persecution on account of a pro-
tected ground, only some evidence must be shown. Here, the record is replete with
evidence that Indians are the victims of racially motivated assaults and other
crimes committed against them by ethnic Fijians, and that the Fijian police are
sometimes either unwilling or unable to control such crime.
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to make such inferences." In fact, the Supreme Court rejected a similar
inference in Elias-Zacarias when it chose not to infer from the context
of a civil war that Elias-Zacarias' refusal to join the guerrillas would be
interpreted by them as a political opinion.59
Another possible source of circumstantial evidence is the asylum-
seeker's job or political position or former political activities. The Ninth
Circuit, for example, inferred a political motive where an applicant who
had been the director of a Sandanista prison in Nicaragua during the
revolt against the Somoza regime faced threats from prisoners after they
had been released. 6° The court was willing to infer from the political
backdrop of the civil war that the former prisoners sought to persecute
the applicant because of his political opinion, not because he was in
Id. Thus, the court used evidence that the civil war was generally motivated by race as cir-
cumstantial evidence that the applicant was robbed and beaten because of his race, even
though he provided no direct evidence of the subjective motivation of his attackers. Evidence
of the ethnic Fijians' general policy of persecuting Indo-Fijians because of their race satisfied
the intent requirement, and subjective motivation was not necessary.
58. The dissenting judge in Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2001), ad-
monished his colleagues for failing to consider the context of the claim, stating,
the majority's conclusion can only be believed if one turns a blind eye to the re-
cent political and socioeconomic history of El Salvador. In 1989, when these
incidents took place, El Salvador was enaged in a lengthy, devastating and highly
polarizing civil war. In such a divided society, it would be unreasonable to pre-
sume that the [applicant's] rape accusation against [party leader] Salazar would
not also be construed as an overtly political act, posing a direct threat to the estab-
lished political order .... Thus, to characterize Salazar's political status as local
[party] leader (and now mayor) as being 'merely incidental' to Molina-Morales's
persecution completely misreads the nature of El Salvadorean society at the time
of these events, and unreasonably downplays the likelihood that Salazar and his
ARENA supporters imputed inimical political views to Molina-Morales.
Id. at 1053 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
59. Elias-Zacarias' counsel argued in the oral arguments that such a refusal to join
would be interpreted by the guerrillas in the context as a political statement that "if he's not
with us, he's against us." Official Transcript of Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the
United States, 1991 U.S. Trans. LEXIS *21, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-1342).
60. Gomez-Saballos v. INS, 79 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1996).
The death threats to him by those imprisoned cannot be separated from his politi-
cal position and the obvious perception to the prisoners that, as the person in
charge of their custody, he adhered to political beliefs in opposition to their own. It
is far from illogical that the prisoners would assume Gomez-Saballos, as director
of the prison, occupied a heightened political role in the revolutionary govern-
ment. It is reasonable to infer that he, above all others, would become targeted by
the prisoners as representing all that was politically wrong with the Sandinista
government.
Id. The court noted in a footnote that "[tihe fact that Gomez-Saballos was the politically-
assigned director of the prison, made his political opinions known to the prisoners through
leading the efforts at rehabilitation, and stated that 'hatred for me ... shone in the eyes' of
the prisoners during rehabilitation sessions is the type of circumstantial evidence that was
lacking in Elias-Zacarias." Id. at 917 n.8.
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charge of their imprisonment and they sought revenge.6' In these cases,
courts conclude from circumstantial evidence that persecutors imputed a
political opinion to the applicant and consequently persecuted him. 2 Not
all courts make this connection, however; in one notable Board of Im-
migration Appeals decision, the Board found inadequate evidence that
Guatemalan guerrillas persecuted a former army specialist on account of
imputed political opinion, although it was clear that his former role
marked him as a government sympathizer.63
As demonstrated in this Part, many courts applying Elias-Zacarias
have developed a defacto direct evidence requirement. Courts favor tes-
timony revealing direct communication between the persecutor and
victim and often fail to consider circumstantial evidence of motive even
when it is available. Such limits on the type of evidence courts consider
adequate are particularly burdensome to asylum-seekers when coupled
with the Supreme Court's administrative law requirement that appellate
courts rely only on evidence "so compelling that no reasonable fact-
finder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution."' This restric-
tion on the quality of evidence stems from principles of administrative
61. Id. at 917 ("The fact that Gomez-Saballos and Chupamango were on opposite sides
of the revolutionary war in Nicaragua, and that Chupamango was responsible for the execu-
tion of Gomez-Saballos's brother as a Sandanista revolutionary, is sufficient to demonstrate
the ideological origins of the dispute between the two men.").
62. For example, in Briones v. INS, the Ninth Circuit inferred that the New People's
Army persecuted the applicant because of his previous role as a confidential informer for the
government against the NPA because, the court reasoned, they must have imputed a political
opinion to him due to his prior actions.
Briones's activity as a confidential informer who sided with the Philippine military
in a conflict that was political at its core certainly would be perceived as a political
act by the group informed upon .... The record here contains no other reason,
plausible or otherwise, why the NPA would want to eliminate Briones other than
his contribution to their defeat in the field, the deaths of their combatants, and the
capture of one of their leaders.
Briones v. INS, 175 F.3d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Cordon-Garcia, 204 F3d, 985,
992 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Absent her affiliation with the government and its push for literacy
among Guatemalans, Petitioner likely would not have come to the guerrillas' attention.").
63. In re C-A-L, 21 1. & N. Dec. 754, Interim Decision 3305 (BIA 1997), 1997 WL
80985. The BIA held that the guerrillas merely wanted to recruit him and obtain information
about the government. The dissent argued that the court should have recognized the circum-
stantial link, stating,
[iut would be most unusual if the guerrillas did not attribute any political opinion
to the respondent, knowing him to be a former military officer. It would be equally
unlikely if the opposing force's interest in the respondent was devoid of any indi-
vidual political objective to punish him for his affiliation with the military which
they found offensive, or if their interest, as posited by the majority, was only to
acquire whatever strategic information might be in the respondent's possession or
to recruit him.
Id. at 762.
64. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 484.
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law and appellate courts' mandated deference to administrative court
decisions. Beyond the difficult burden on applicants to provide sufficient
evidence, the disparity among courts interpreting Elias-Zacarias--of
which not all accept circumstantial evidence-results in arbitrary and
inconsistent adjudication of asylum cases. Seemingly similar cases
emerge with opposite results depending on the panel of judges deciding
the case and the tidbits of communication an asylum applicant is able to
recall. This inconsistency may be a result of the Supreme Court's failure
to specify appropriate methodology for evaluating direct and circum-
stantial evidence in Elias-Zacarias, or may simply be lower courts'
attempts to simplify the decision-making process. Regardless of the rea-
son, the disparate evidentiary requirements in place nearly ten years
after Elias-Zacarias cannot have been the Court's intention. Moreover,
as Part III will show, the defacto direct evidence requirement is contrary
to the United States' obligations under the Convention.
III. REALIGNING THE ELIAS-ZACARIAS NEXUS REQUIREMENT
WITH INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
As discussed in Part II, courts deny many asylum applications based
on otherwise legitimate asylum claims because they cannot provide di-
rect evidence of their persecutors' motives, and because the court
refuses to infer intent from the circumstantial evidence provided. In
other words, as it has been construed in the lower courts, Elias-Zacarias
adds an additional requirement to the Convention: direct evidence of
intent. Because the Refugee Act of 1980 was intended to fulfill the
United States' obligations under the Convention, the Supreme Court's
construction of the statute should not carry the United States away from
compliance with the treaty. 6' Thus, until the Supreme Court speaks again
65. The Supreme Court has long followed the rule of statutory construction requiring
the Court to interpret U.S. statutes consistently with international legal obligations if possi-
ble. See Murray v. Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch. 64, 118 (1804) ("It has also been observed
that an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neu-
tral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this
country."). See also Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15
BERKELEY J. INT'L LAW 1, 21 (1997):
Elias-Zacarias illustrates the dangers of a domestic asylum system disconnected
from an international framework. The Convention and Protocol do not explicitly
address lrocedural issues such as burden of proof. While this leaves states with
considerable flexibility to design their refugee status determination systems, they
remain fully obligated to act in good faith and consistently with the treaties' re-
quirements-most importantly the prohibition on refoulement .... To require
strict proof of a singular cause of persecution defies both human experience and
the premises of refugee law.
Winter 20021
Michigan Journal of International Law
on the nexus issue, lower courts applying the motive-based approach of
Elias-Zacarias must find a way to construe it that is compatible with
international law. Part III discusses a means of bringing U.S. courts' in-
terpretation of the nexus requirement closer to the text and purpose of
the Convention and other state parties' interpretations of the Convention
while still adhering to the precedent of Elias-Zacarias. Specifically, this
Part urges courts to consider refugees' predicaments as circumstantial
evidence of their persecutors' intent, thereby focusing the asylum pro-
ceedings more on the applicant instead of the persecutor.
An approach that focuses on the asylum applicant's predicament is
more consistent with the United States' obligations under the Conven-
tion because the text of the Convention supports a predicament-based
approach. In the Convention, the nexus requirement ("for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion") modifies the phrase "being persecuted." 66 The passive
voice in the phrase "being persecuted" may indicate the framers' intent
to emphasize the refugee's situation-the effects of the acts or threats of
persecution-not the motive behind the persecutors' actions that caused
the situation. In the refugee definition the United States included within
the Refugee Act, however, the nexus requirement modifies the word
"persecution"; the causal link is articulated as "on account of' the Con-
vention grounds instead of "for reasons of. ' 67 The lack of passive voice
in the Refugee Act may explain why American courts have focused on
the persecutors' motive, rather than the refugee's predicament, because
"persecution" implies an intentional act by a specific actor, whereas
"being persecuted" targets the result, not the actor's intentions. 6' Addi-
tionally, the "on account of' language-which the Supreme Court
translated into "because of"69--points more to the persecutor's personal
motives than "for reasons of," which allows for reasons other than the
persecutor's motive.0 Despite its different statutory language, the United
States still has an obligation to adhere to the Convention's requirements,
including the definition. As a signatory to the Protocol, the United States
66. Protocol, supra note 3.
67. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (2000).
68. The INS focused on the "persecution" language in its Supreme Court brief in Elias-
Zacarias, arguing that the ordinary meaning of "persecution" is "the infliction of suffering
because of the victim's race, beliefs, or nationality, especially religious beliefs." Brief for
Petitioner at Argument A. l, para. 1, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-1342) (quoting the definition of
"persecution" from 7 Oxford English Dictionary 721 (1933): "The action of persecuting or
pursuing with enmity and malignity").
69. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483 ("Elias-Zacarias still has to establish that the record
also compels the conclusion that ... the guerrillas will persecute him because of that politi-
cal opinion, rather than because of his refusal to fight with them.") (emphasis added).
70. See Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50-51 (1983).
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agreed to apply the Convention's non-derogable definition of a "refu-
gee."
,71
Moreover, the framers of the Convention rejected the "on account
of' language suggested by the United States.72 This outright rejection
indicates that a judicial application of the nexus requirement dependent
upon the "on account of' language cannot possibly comport with the
object and purpose of the Convention. Therefore, in order to meet U.S.
obligations under the Convention, U.S. courts must not apply the nexus
requirement differently than other state parties regardless of the distinct
statutory language in the Refugee Act. U.S. courts must analyze nexus
in a manner consistent with other state parties' application of the origi-
nal Convention definition.
In addition to implementing the text of the Convention, a focus on
predicament better effectuates the purposes behind the Convention than
a focus on motive. As described in Part II, courts' search for persecutors'
motives often resembles a criminal trial with an absent defendant, with
Immigration Judges interrogating applicants about their persecutors'
motives, rather than focusing on the predicament of the applicant. How-
ever, the Convention was adopted not to punish persecutors, but to
provide surrogate protection to refugees.73 The purpose of the Conven-
tion is to respond to the immediate needs of people who need help and
have nowhere else to turn, not to rebuke the people who rendered them
helpless. A detailed inquiry into the mens rea of persecutors is inconsis-
tent with this fundamental purpose, because it shifts the court's focus
away from the question of the refugee's need for surrogate protection
and toward the state of mind of the absent persecutor.
7 4
71. The Convention specifically prohibits states from making reservations to the refugee
definition. Convention, supra note 1, art. 42(1) ("[A]ny State may make reservations to Ar-
ticles ... other than to Article I ").
72. See United States of America: Memorandum on the Definition Article of the Pre-
liminary Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and Stateless Persons) in THE
COLLECTED TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE 1951 GENEVA CONVENTION RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES, VOL. 1, 359, 359 (Alex Takkenberg & Christopher Tahbaz, eds., 1990).
73. See, e.g., Horvath v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000] 3 All E.R. 577 (H.L.
2000) ("The general purpose of the convention is to enable the person who no longer has the
benefit of protection against persecution for a convention reason in his own country to turn
for protection to the international community."); Canada (Att'y General) v. Ward, [1993]
2 S.C.R. 689, 691 ("International refugee law was formulated to serve as back-up to the
protection owed a national by his or her state"); HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS supra note 2,
at 124 ("[R]efugee law is designed to interpose the protection of the international community
only in situations where there is no reasonable expectation that adequate national protection
of core human rights will be forthcoming").
74. The UNHCR's amicus brief in Elias-Zacarias emphasized that asylum determina-
tions must focus on the refugee, not the persecutors. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees in Support of Respondent at 16, Elias-
Zacarias (No. 90-1342).
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A legal analogy more consistent with the purposes of refugee law is
anti-discrimination law, which allows claimants to prevail if they can
prove either discriminatory intent or disparate impact." The idea behind
examining discriminatory impact is a recognition of the difficulty of
proving intent, and nowhere is it more difficult to prove intent than in
asylum adjudication, where the persecutors are often unidentified, un-
known and certainly not present before the court or subject to
discovery.7 6 More importantly, in asylum law, unlike both criminal law
and anti-discrimination law, it is even more inappropriate to focus on
motive because the Convention was not adopted for the purpose of cen-
suring particular acts, but to address particular risks.
In disparate impact cases under American employment discrimina-
tion statutes, courts utilize evidence of discriminatory impact on
protected groups as circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.77
Likewise, asylum adjudicators should use evidence of the applicant's
predicament as circumstantial evidence of her persecutor's motive. Con-
[T]he focus on a persecutor's intent injects into a refugee status determination the
burden of proof required in an unrelated field of criminal law. [The INS's] inter-
pretation of the 'on account of' language would require an asylum-seeker to prove
something akin to mens rea on the part of the persecutor. But refugee status exam-
iners are not called upon to decide the criminal guilt or liability of the persecutor,
and refugee status is not dependent on such proof. The legal regime of refugee
protection-of which the Refugee Act is a part-is centered on the grant of a hu-
manitarian benefit, not on the punishment of persecutors. Thus, an asylum-
seeker's burden is to show himself worthy of the benefit; he need not establish his
persecutor's state of mind.
Id.
75. For a domestic example, plaintiffs who bring claims of employment discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, or disability under United States civil
rights statutes can prove discrimination either through showing discriminatory intent or
demonstrating than neutral policies have a disparate impact on certain protected groups. See
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Discriminatory impact is also an acceptable
theory under international anti-discrimination law. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Sep.3, 1981, art. 1, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 16;
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
76. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, it is contrary to the purpose of U.S. anti-
discrimination law to treat two policies that have the same discriminatory effects differently
because a plaintiff cannot prove a discriminatory intent behind the policy. See, e.g., Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) ("[T]he necessary premise of the dispa-
rate impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted without a deliberately
discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimina-
tion.").
77. For instance, courts use statistical evidence that a certain group is adversely im-
pacted by a facially neutral policy when proof of discriminatory intent is elusive or
nonexistent. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 986-89; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-
32 (1971). See generally JOHN J. DONAHUE III, FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW 260-61 (1997).
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sider, for example, Molina-Morales, whose asylum case was rejected by
the Ninth Circuit as discussed in Part 11.71 Molina-Morales was tortured
by an opposition group in El Salvador because he reported to authorities
that his aunt was raped by the leader of that group. The court denied his
asylum claims, finding no evidence that his attackers tortured him be-
cause they thought he opposed their political goals.79 The court might
have considered the predicament in which the applicant found himself-
tortured by an opposition group for reporting their misdeeds, in a coun-
try long embittered by civil war-as circumstantial evidence that his
attack was "on account of' his imputed political opinion. Drawing such
inferences of nexus from circumstantial evidence is appropriate under
Elias-Zacarias, in which the Supreme Court emphasized that circum-
stantial evidence of a Convention-related motive will suffice to establish
nexus.
Asylum decisionmakers should use circumstantial evidence of both
the applicant's individual predicament and the circumstances in her
home country to draw inferences of a Convention-related motive. This
approach is more consistent with the text and purposes of both the
Convention and Elias-Zacarias, and will likely lead to fewer arbitrary
and inconsistent decisions. Recognizing that a predicament-based
approach to nexus is consistent with the Convention, the Michigan
Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground propose such an
approach.0 Under the Guidelines, an applicant can establish a nexus to a
Convention ground even without evidence of her persecutors' motive, so
long as she demonstrates that the Convention ground contributed to her
exposure to the risk of persecution. U.S. courts should engage in the
predicament analysis advocated by the Michigan Guidelines to move the
78. Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2001). See also supra note 58 (dis-
cussing the dissenting opinion in the case).
79. Molina-Morales, 237 E3d at 1051.
Molina has not presented any evidence that supports, much less compels, a con-
clusion that his persecutors attributed a political opinion to him. Rather, as the
BIA stated, 'the evidence suggests that he fears harm because of a personal matter
between him and Carmen Salazar.' There is no evidence that Molina's attackers
thought that he was aligned with any opposition to the ARENA party.
Id.
80. James C. Hathaway, Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 210 (2002). Additionally, the UNHCR's amicus brief in Elias-
Zacarias condoned a predicament based approach. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees in Support of Respondent at 16, Elias-
Zacarias (No. 90-1342) ("'As long as persecution or fear of it may be related to the grounds
given in the definition, it is irrelevant whether the [persecutor] intended to persecute. It is the
result which matters."') (quoting Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees
(Geneva), Inter-Office Memorandum/Field-Office Memorandum (unnumbered) (Mar. 1,
1990)).
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U.S. nexus approach closer to compliance with the mandates of the
Convention.
CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed the evolution of the nexus requirement in
the United States, from the Elias-Zacarias decision in 1992 to the pres-
ent. As Part II identified, in the ten years since the Court delivered the
decision, lower courts have proven reluctant to rely on the applicant's
predicament as circumstantial evidence of motive and, as a result, have
rendered many inconsistent asylum decisions. Not only is this practice
contrary to the United States' obligations under the Convention, but it is
also contrary to Elias-Zacarias itself. As Part III argued, courts should
focus less on the nearly impossible task of determining the persecutors'
states of mind, and more on asylum applicants' predicaments.
